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Referências bibliograficas das Cartas Dynamo n. 71 e 72

2025-05-13T16:47:20-03:001 de janeiro de 2020|

  • Ahdieh, R. (2009) The (misunderstood) genius of American corporate law. Emory University School of Law, research paper n. 10-57.
  • Armour, J., Skeel, D. (2006) Who whites the rules for hostile takeovers, and why? – The peculiar divergence of US and UK takeover regulation. Center for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
  • Armour, J. et alli (2010) A comparative analysis of hostile takeover regimes in the US, UK and Japan (with implications for emerging markets).
  • Armour, J. et alli (2011) The evolution of hostile takeover regimes in develop and emerging markets: an analytical framework. Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 52.
  • Bebchuk, L. (1992) Federalism and the corporation: the desirable limits on state competition in corporate law. Harvard Law Review, vol. 105. n.7.
  • Bebchuk, L. (2002) The case against board veto in corporate takeovers. The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 69.
  • Bebchuk, L., Ferrel, A. (1999) Federalism and Takeover law: the race to protect managers from takeovers.
  • Bebchuk, L., Ferrel, A. (2001) A new approach to takeover law and regulatory competition. NBER, working paper n. 8148.
  • Bebchuk, L., Ferrel, A. (2002) On takeover law and regulatory competition. Harvard Law School. Harvard Law School, discussion paper n. 363.
  • Bebchuk, L., Hamdani, A. (2002) Optimal defaults for corporate law evolution. Harvard Law School, discussion paper n. 343.
  • Bebchuk, L., Hamdani, A. (2002) Vigorous race or leisurely walk: reconsidering the competition over corporate charters. Harvard Law School, discussion paper n. 376.
  • Black, B. (2001) The principal fiduciary duties of boards of directors. Presentation at 3th Asian Roundtable on Corporate Governance.
  • Black, B., Kraakman, R. (2002) Delaware´s takeover law: the uncertain search for hidden value. Northwestern University Law Review, vol 96, n. 2.
  • Comissão de Valores Imobiliarios (2007) Instrução n. 461.
  • Comissão de Valores Imobiliarios (2010) Instrução n. 487.
  • Davidoff, S. (2007) The SEC and the failure of federal takeover regulation. Florida State University Law Review, vol n. 34.
  • Davies, H (2004) What´s left for self-regulation.
  • Davies, P. at alli. (2010) The takeover directive as a protectionist tool? ECGI, working paper n. 141.
  • Eizirik, N., at alli (2010), Proposta de criação do CAF, submetida à BM&Bovespa.
  • Gorga, E (2008) Changing the paradigm of stock ownership from concentrated towards dispersed ownership? Evidence from Brazil and consequences for emerging countries. Cornell Law Library, FGV Law School-SP.
  • Greenwood, D. (2005) Democracy and Delaware: the mysterious race to the top/bottom. University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law.
  • Ferrarini, G., Miller, G. (2009) Takeover regulation in the United States and Europe. Cornell International Law Journal, vol. 42.
  • Friedlander, J. (2008) Overturn Time-Warner three different ways. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, vol. 33.
  • Gilson, R. (2000) Unocal fifteen years later (and what we can do about it).
  • Hamermesh, L. (2006) The policy foundations of Delaware corporate law. Columbia Law Review, working paper, vol 106, n. 7, forthcoming.
  • Hamermesh, L. (2007) How we make law in Delaware, and what to expect from us in the future. Journal of Business & Technology Law, vol 2.
  • Hill, J. (2010) Takeovers, poison pills and protectionism in comparative corporate governance. University of Sidney, Faculty Law.
  • Iantosca, J. (2007) corporate board authority in takeover bids: a comparative analysis of the EU and US approaches. University of Lund, Faculty of Law.
  • Jordan, C, Hughes, P. (2007) Which way for market institutions: the fundamental question of self-regulation. Berkeley Business Law Journal.
  • Jr, Leo S. (2005) The Delaware way: how we do corporate law and some of the new challenges we (and Europe) face. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, vol. 30.
  • Jr, Lewis B. (2007) Why corporations choose Delaware? Delaware Department of State.
  • Kahan, M., Rock, E. (2005) Symbiotic federalism and the structure of corporate law. Vanderbilt Law Review, vol.58.
  • Kihlstrom, R., Watcher, M. (2005) Corporate policy and the coherence of Delaware takeover law. University of Pennsylvania Law School.
  • Lipton, M. at alli (2001) pills, polls and professors: a reply to professor Gilson. New York University, Center for Law and Business.
  • Magnuson, W. (2009) Takeover regulation in the US and Europe: an institution approach. Harvard Law School.
  • Mukwiri, J. (2011) The myth of tactical litigation in UK takeovers. Durham University Research.
  • Nilsen, A. (2004) The EU takeover directive and the competitiveness of European industry. OCGG Economy analysis, n. 1.
  • Patricia, K (2011) Use of derivatives by shareholder activists. Torys on M&A.
  • Roe, M. (1994) Strong managers, weak owners: The political roots of American corporate finance. Princeton University Press.
  • Roe, M. (2005) Delaware´s Politics. Harvard Law School, discussion paper n. 511.
  • Roe, M. (2009) Delaware and Washington as corporate lawmakers. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, vol n. 34.
  • Rosenzweig, B. (2007) Private versus public regulation: a comparative analysis of British and American takeover controls. Duke University School of Law.
  • Securities and Exchange Commission (2011) Beneficial ownership reporting requirements and security-based swaps.
  • Scalia, A. (1995) Common-law courts in a civil-law system: the role of US Federal Couts in interpreting the Constitution and laws. The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Princeton University.
  • Swift, J. (2011) Takeover panel sweetens code for targets after Cadbury lesson. Thelawer.com.
  • The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (2009). The Takeover Code. Ninth edition.
  • The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (2010) Review of certain aspects of the regulation of takeover bids.
  • US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (2008) CSX x The Children´s Investment Fund Mgmt.
  • Williams, A. (2004) An economics theory of self-regulation. London School of Economics and Political Science.

Referências bibliograficas das Cartas Dynamo n. 73 e 74

2025-05-13T15:18:41-03:001 de janeiro de 2019|

  • Arnold, M. (2011) The economics costs of excessive short-termism. Hyperion Asset Management, III Portfolio Construction Forum.
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  • Barton, D. (2011) Capitalism for the long term. Harvard Business Review.
  • Bartov, E. (1993) The timing of asset sales and earnings manipulation. The Accounting Review, n. 68.
  • Bauman, Z. (2000) Modernidade líquida.
  • Bens, D, et al. (2002) The relationship between stock options and stock repurchases.
  • Bens, D, et al. (2003) Employee stock options, EPS dilution, and stock repurchases. Journal of Accounting Economics, 36.
  • Bogle, J. (2005) The mutual fund industry sixty years later: for better and worse? Essay for the 60th anniversary of the Financial Analysts Journal.
  • Booth, P. (2011) Are financial markets ‘short-termist’? A crucial gap in Haldane´s argument.
  • Buffett, W. (1983) Berkshire Hathaway, Letter to Shareholders.
  • Bushee, B. (1998) The influence of institutional investor in myopic R&D investment behavior. Accounting Review 73.
  • CFA Institute (2005) Breaking the short-term cycle. Discussion and recommendations on how corporate leaders, asset managers, investors, and analysts can refocus on long-term value.
  • Cheng, M. et al (2007) Earnings guidance and managerial myopia.
  • Dallas, L. (2011) Short-termism, the financial crises and corporate governance. University of San Diego, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, n. 11-052.
  • Dechow, P., Sloan, R. (1991) Executive incentives and the horizon problem: an empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 14.
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  • Gorga, E (2008) Changing the paradigm of stock ownership from concentrated towards dispersed ownership? Evidence from Brazil and consequences for emerging countries. Cornell Law Library, FGV Law School-SP.
  • Greenwood, D. (2005) Democracy and Delaware: the mysterious race to the top/bottom. University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law.
  • Ferrarini, G., Miller, G. (2009) Takeover regulation in the United States and Europe. Cornell International Law Journal, vol. 42.
  • Friedlander, J. (2008) Overturn Time-Warner three different ways. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, vol. 33.
  • Gilson, R. (2000) Unocal fifteen years later (and what we can do about it).
  • Haldane, A. (2010) Patience and Finance. Bank of England, Speech at the Oxford China Business Forum, Beijing.
  • Haldane, A. (2011) The Short long. Bank of England, Speech at the 29th Sociètè Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Financieres, Brussels.
  • Institute for Sustainable Futures (2007) Causes of short-termism in the financial sector.
  • James III, R. (2010) Applying neuroscience to financial planning practice: framework and review. Texas Tech University.
  • Karlsson, P. et al. (2008) CEO succession 2007: the performance paradox.
  • Keynes, J. M. (1936) The general theory of employment, interest and money.
  • Laibson, D. (1997) Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting. The Quarterly Journal of Economics.
  • Laverty, K. (1996) Economic “short-termism”: the debate, the unresolved issues, and the implications for management practice and research. The Academy of Management Review, vol 21, n.
  • Marathon Club (2006) Long-term, long-only investing, a consultation paper.
  • Mauboussin, M. (2006) Long-term investing in a short-term world. How psychology and incentives shape the investment industry. Legg Mason Capital Management.
  • McClure, S. et al. (2004) Separate neural systems value immediate and delayed monetary rewards. American Association for the Advancement of Science, vol 306, n. 5695.
  • Mizik, N. (2010) The theory and practice of myopic management. Journal of Marketing Research, vol XLVII.
  • Metcalfe, J.e Mischel, W. (1999) A hot/cool-system analysis of delay of gratification: dynamics of willpower. Psychological Review, 106.
  • Montier, J. (2007) Behavioral investing. John Wiley and Sons.
  • Rappaport, A. (2005) The Economics of short-term performance obsession. Financial analysts Journal, vol 61, n.3.
  • Repenning, N., Henderson, R. (2010) Making the numbers? “Short termism” & the puzzle of only occasional disaster, NBER, working paper 16367.
  • Roychowdhury, S. (2006) Earnings management through real activities manipulation. Sloan School of Management, MIT.
  • Sanfey, A. et al. (2006) Neuroeconomics: cross-currents in research on decision-making. Trends in Cognitive Science, 10(3).
  • Shleifer, A. e Vishy, R. (1990) The new theory of the firm; equilibrium short horizons of investors and firms. AEA Papers and Proceedings, vol 80, n.2.
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