{"id":5539,"date":"2026-10-22T15:01:01","date_gmt":"2026-10-22T18:01:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.dynamo.com.br\/?p=5539"},"modified":"2026-10-22T15:01:01","modified_gmt":"2026-10-22T18:01:01","slug":"bibliographic-references-dynamo-report-126","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.dynamo.com.br\/en\/bibliographic-references-dynamo-report-126\/","title":{"rendered":"Bibliographic References Dynamo Report 126"},"content":{"rendered":"
    \n
  • Brannon, I. (2018) Diminishing the power of proxy advisory firms. Capital Policy Analytics.<\/li>\n
  • Business Roundtable (2023) Letter to the Chairman of House Financial Services Committee and Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 12Jul, 23.<\/li>\n
  • Cai, J. et al (2009) Electing directors, The Journal of Finance, 64.<\/li>\n
  • Choi, S. et al. (2010) The power of proxy advisors: myth or reality, Emory Law Journal 59, 869-918.<\/li>\n
  • Copland, J., Larker, D., Tayan, B (2018) Proxy advisory firms: empirical evidence and the case for reform.<\/li>\n
  • Department of Labor (1994) Federal Register Volume 59, number 145 (Friday, July 29, 19940], from the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov] [FR Doc No: 94-18198]<\/li>\n
  • Daines, R., Goe, I. and Larker, D. (2010) Rating the Ratings: How Good are Commercial Governance Ratings, Journal of Financial Economics, Dec 2010, Vol. 98. Issue 3, pages 439-461.<\/li>\n
  • Glass Lewis (2025) Brazil Benchmark Policy Guidelines<\/li>\n
  • Haan S. (2023) Voting rights in corporate governance: historical and political economy, electronic copy available at: https:\/\/ssrn.com\/abstract=4299462<\/li>\n
  • Hu, E. et al (2024) Custom proxy voting advice. Nov 24.<\/li>\n
  • Institutional Shareholder Services \u2013 ISS (2018) Letter to Senate banking committee member, electronic available at: https:\/\/www.issgovernance.com\/file\/duediligence\/20180530-iss-letter-to-senate-banking-committee-members.pdf<\/li>\n
  • Institutional Shareholder Services \u2013 ISS (2024a) Brazil Proxy Voting Guidelines: Benchmarks for Policy Recommendations, Jan, 24<\/li>\n
  • Institutional Shareholder Services \u2013 ISS (2024b) Brazil Remote Voting Card (RVC) Frequently Asked Questions, update Aug 19, 24.<\/li>\n
  • Kahan, M. e Rock, E. (2010) Embattled CEOs, Tex L. Rev 987<\/li>\n
  • Krahnen, J. et al., (2023) The controversy over proxy voting: the role of asset managers and proxy advisors. Harvard Law School.<\/li>\n
  • Larker, D., Scneider, R., Tayan, B., Boyd, A. (2015) Investor Survey: Deconstructing Proxy Statements \u2013 What Matters to Investors. Stanford University, RR Donnelley, and Equilar. Feb 15.<\/li>\n
  • Malenko, N. e Shen, Y. (2016) The role of proxy advisory firms: evidence from a regression-discontinuity design, The Review of Financial Studies, 29.<\/li>\n
  • McCahery, J. (2015) Behind the scenes: the corporate governance preferences of institutional investors. Journal of Finance, forthcoming, jun.<\/li>\n
  • Pensions&Investiments (2025) J.P. Morgan\u00b4s Dimon slams proxy firms as a \u2018cancer\u2019, urges elimination, May,30.<\/li>\n
  • Placenti, F. (2018) Are proxy advisory firms really a problem? Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance.<\/li>\n
  • Prete, R. (2025) CalPERS CEO: Eliminating proxy firms would harm institutional investors. Jun,18.<\/li>\n
  • Rose, P., Walker, C. (2020) Examining the SEC\u00b4s proxy advisory rule. Center for Capital Markets Competitiviness.<\/li>\n
  • Rose, S. (1990) Optional Cumulative Voting & Staggered Terms of Directors: Is the California Climate Warming to Corporations? 27 San Diego L. Rev. 467, 483 n.133<\/li>\n
  • Rosenberg, H. (2000) Mudando de lado: A Luta de Robert A. G. Monks pela Governan\u00e7a Corporativa na Am\u00e9rica. Editora Campus.<\/li>\n
  • SEC (2020) Recommendation of the SEC Investor Advisory Committee (IAC) Relation to SEC Guidance and Rule Proposals on Proxy Advisory and Shareholder Proposals, at 5 (24jan20).<\/li>\n
  • Shu, C. (2024) The proxy advisory industry: influencing and being influenced, Journal of financial Economics, forthcoming.<\/li>\n
  • Society for Corporate Governance (2020) Letter to US SEC Secretary, RE SEC file number S7-22-19, Feb3.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[26],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5539","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-biblioteca_en"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.dynamo.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5539","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.dynamo.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.dynamo.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.dynamo.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/8"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.dynamo.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5539"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.dynamo.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5539\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5540,"href":"https:\/\/www.dynamo.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5539\/revisions\/5540"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.dynamo.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5539"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.dynamo.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5539"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.dynamo.com.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5539"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}